softwarecrisis-dev-7c7z9g.txt (50327B)
1 [1]Out of the Software Crisis Bird flying logo [2]Newsletter [3]Book [4]AI Book 2 [5]Archive [6]Author 3 4 Modern software quality, or why I think using language models for programming 5 is a bad idea 6 7 By Baldur Bjarnason, 8 May 30th, 2023 9 10 This essay is based on a talk I gave at [7]Hakkavélin, a hackerspace in 11 Reykjavík. I had a wonderful time presenting to a lovely crowd, full of 12 inquisitive and critically-minded people. Their questions and the discussion 13 afterwards led to a number of improvements and clarifications as I turned my 14 notes into this letter. This resulted in a substantial expansion of this essay. 15 Many of the expanded points, such as the ones surrounding language model 16 security, come directly from these discussions. 17 18 Many thanks to all of those who attended. The references for the presentation 19 are also the references for this essay, which you can find all the way down in 20 the footnotes section. 21 22 The best way to support this newsletter or my blog is to buy one of my books, 23 [8]The Intelligence Illusion: a practical guide to the business risks of 24 Generative AI or [9]Out of the Software Crisis. Or, you can buy them both [10] 25 as a bundle. 26 27 The software industry is very bad at software 28 29 Here’s a true story. Names withheld to protect the innocent. 30 31 A chain of stores here in Iceland recently upgraded their point-of-sale 32 terminals to use new software. 33 34 Disaster, obviously, ensued. The barcode scanner stopped working properly, 35 leading customer to be either overcharged or undercharged. Everything was 36 extremely slow. The terminals started to lock up regularly. The new invoice 37 printer sucked. A process that had been working smoothly was now harder and 38 took more time. 39 40 The store, where my “informant” is a manager, deals with a lot of businesses, 41 many of them stores. When they explain to their customers why everything is 42 taking so long, their answer is generally the same: 43 44 “Ah, software upgrade. The same happened to us when we upgraded our terminals.” 45 46 This is the norm. 47 48 The new software is worse in every way than what it’s replacing. Despite having 49 a more cluttered UI, it seems to have omitted a bunch of important features. 50 Despite being new and “optimised”, it’s considerably slower than what it’s 51 replacing. 52 53 This is also the norm. 54 55 Switching costs are, more often than not, massive for business software, and 56 purchases are not decided by anybody who actually uses it. The quality of the 57 software disconnects from sales performance very quickly in a growing software 58 company. The company ends up “owning” the customer and no longer has any 59 incentive to improve the software. In fact, because adding features is a key 60 marketing and sales tactic, the software development cycle becomes an act of 61 intentional, controlled deterioration. 62 63 Enormous engineering resources go into finding new ways to minimise the 64 deterioration—witness Microsoft’s “ribbon menu”, a widget invented entirely to 65 manage the feature escalation mandated by marketing. 66 67 This is the norm. 68 69 This has always been the norm, from the early days of software. 70 71 The software industry is bad at software. Great at shipping features and 72 selling software. Bad at the software itself. 73 74 Why I started researching “AI” for programming 75 76 In most sectors of the software industry, sales performance and product quality 77 are disconnected. 78 79 By its nature software has enormous margins which further cushion it from the 80 effect of delivering bad products. 81 82 The objective impact of poor software quality on the bottom lines of companies 83 like Microsoft, Google, Apple, Facebook, or the retail side of Amazon is a 84 rounding error. The rest only need to deliver usable early versions, but once 85 you have an established customer base and an experienced sales team, you can 86 coast for a long, long time without improving your product in any meaningful 87 way. 88 89 You only need to show change. Improvements don’t sell, it’s freshness that 90 moves product. It’s like store tomatoes. Needs to look good and be fresh. 91 They’re only going to taste it after they’ve paid, so who cares about the 92 actual quality. 93 94 Uptime reliability is the only quality measurement with a real impact on ad 95 revenue or the success of enterprise contracts, so that’s the only quality 96 measurement that ultimately matters to them. 97 98 Bugs, shoddy UX, poor accessibility—even when accessibility is required by 99 law—are non-factors in modern software management, especially at larger 100 software companies. 101 102 The rest of us in the industry then copy their practices, and we mostly get 103 away with it. Our margins may not be as enormous as Google’s, but they are 104 still quite good compared to non-software industries. 105 106 We have an industry that’s largely disconnected from the consequences of making 107 bad products, which means that we have a lot of successful but bad products. 108 109 The software crisis 110 111 Research bears this out. I pointed out in my 2021 essay [11]Software Crisis 2.0 112 that very few non-trivial software projects are successful, even when your 113 benchmarks are fundamentally conservative and short term. 114 115 For example, the following table is from [12]a 2015 report by the Standish 116 Group on their long term study in software project success: 117 118 SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGED FAILED TOTAL 119 Grand 6% 51% 43% 100% 120 Large 11% 59% 30% 100% 121 Medium 12% 62% 26% 100% 122 Moderate 24% 64% 12% 100% 123 Small 61% 32% 7% 100% 124 125 The Chaos Report 2015 resolution by project size 126 127 This is based on data that’s collected and anonymised from a number of 128 organisations in a variety of industries. You’ll note that very few projects 129 outright succeed. Most of them go over budget or don’t deliver the 130 functionality they were supposed to. A frightening number of large projects 131 outright fail to ship anything usable. 132 133 In my book [13]Out of the Software Crisis, I expanded on this by pointing out 134 that there are many classes and types of bugs and defects that we don’t measure 135 at all, many of them catastrophic, which means that these estimates are 136 conservative. Software project failure is substantially higher than commonly 137 estimated, and success if much rarer than the numbers would indicate. 138 139 The true percentage of large software projects that are genuinely successful in 140 the long term—that don’t have any catastrophic bugs, don’t suffer from UX 141 deterioration, don’t end up having core issues that degrade their business 142 value—is probably closer to 1–3%. 143 144 The management crisis 145 146 We also have a management crisis. 147 148 The methods of top-down-control taught to managers are counterproductive for 149 software development. 150 151 • Managers think design is about decoration when it’s the key to making 152 software that generates value. 153 • Trying to prevent projects that are likely to fail is harmful for your 154 career, even if the potential failure is wide-ranging and potentially 155 catastrophic. 156 • When projects fail, it’s the critics who tried to prevent disaster who are 157 blamed, not the people who ran it into the ground. 158 • Supporting a project that is guaranteed to fail is likely to benefit your 159 career, establish you as a “team player”, and protects you from harmful 160 consequences when the project crashes. 161 • Teams and staff management in the software industry commonly ignores every 162 innovation and discovery in organisational psychology, management, and 163 systems-thinking since the early sixties and operate mostly on management 164 ideas that Henry Ford considered outdated in the 1920s. 165 166 We are a mismanaged industry that habitually fails to deliver usable software 167 that actually solves the problems it’s supposed to. 168 169 Thus, [14]Weinberg’s Law: 170 171 If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the 172 first woodpecker that came along would destroy civilization. 173 174 It’s into this environment that “AI” software development tools appear. 175 176 The punditry presented it as a revolutionary improvement in how we make 177 software. It’s supposed to fix everything. 178 179 —This time the silver bullet will work! 180 181 Because, of course, we have had such a great track record with [15]silver 182 bullets. 183 184 So, I had to dive into it, research it, and figure out how it really worked. I 185 needed to understand how generative AI works, as a system. I haven’t researched 186 any single topic to this degree since I finished my PhD in 2006. 187 188 This research led me to write my book [16]The Intelligence Illusion: a 189 practical guide to the business risks of Generative AI. In it, I take a broader 190 view and go over the risks I discovered that come with business use of 191 generative AI. 192 193 But, ultimately, all that work was to answer the one question that I was 194 ultimately interested in: 195 196 Is generative AI good or bad for software development? 197 198 To even have a hope of answering this, we first need to define our terms, 199 because the conclusion is likely to vary a lot depending on how you define “AI” 200 or even "software development. 201 202 A theory of software development as an inclusive system 203 204 Software development is the entire system of creating, delivering, and using a 205 software project, from idea to end-user. 206 207 That includes the entire process on the development side—the idea, planning, 208 management, design, collaboration, programming, testing, prototyping—as well as 209 the value created by the system when it has been shipped and is being used. 210 211 My model is that of [17]theory-building. From my essay on theory-building, 212 which itself is an excerpt from [18]Out of the Software Crisis: 213 214 Beyond that, software is a theory. It’s a theory about a particular 215 solution to a problem. Like the proverbial garden, it is composed of a 216 microscopic ecosystem of artefacts, each of whom has to be treated like a 217 living thing. The gardener develops a sense of how the parts connect and 218 affect each other, what makes them thrive, what kills them off, and how you 219 prompt them to grow. The software project and its programmers are an 220 indivisible and organic entity that our industry treats like a toy model 221 made of easily replaceable lego blocks. They believe a software project and 222 its developers can be broken apart and reassembled without dying. 223 224 What keeps the software alive are the programmers who have an accurate 225 mental model (theory) of how it is built and works. That mental model can 226 only be learned by having worked on the project while it grew or by working 227 alongside somebody who did, who can help you absorb the theory. Replace 228 enough of the programmers, and their mental models become disconnected from 229 the reality of the code, and the code dies. That dead code can only be 230 replaced by new code that has been ‘grown’ by the current programmers. 231 232 Design and user research is an integral part of the mental model the programmer 233 needs to build, because none of the software components ultimately make sense 234 without the end-user. 235 236 But, design is also vital because it is, to reuse Donald G. Reinertsen’s 237 definition from Managing the Design Factory (p. 11), design is economically 238 useful information that generally only becomes useful information through 239 validation of some sort. Otherwise it’s just a guess. 240 241 The economic part usually comes from the end-user in some way. 242 243 This systemic view is inclusive by design as you can’t accurately measure the 244 productivity or quality of a software project unless you look at it end to end, 245 from idea to end-user. 246 247 • If it doesn’t work for the end-user, then it’s a failure. 248 • If the management is dysfunctional, then the entire system is 249 dysfunctional. 250 • If you keep starting projects based on unworkable ideas, then your 251 programmer productivity doesn’t matter. 252 253 Lines of code isn’t software development. Working software, productively used, 254 understood by the developers, is software development. 255 256 A high-level crash course in language models 257 258 Language models, small or large, are today either used as autocomplete copilots 259 or as chatbots. Some of these language model tools would be used by the 260 developer, some by the manager or other staff. 261 262 I’m treating generative media and image models as a separate topic, even when 263 they’re used by people in the software industry to generate icons, graphics, or 264 even UIs. They matter as well, but don’t have the same direct impact on 265 software quality. 266 267 To understand the role these systems could play in software development, we 268 need a little bit more detail on what language models are, how they are made, 269 and how they work. 270 271 Most modern machine learning models are layered networks of parameters, each 272 representing its connection to its neighbouring parameters. In a modern 273 transformer-based language model most of these parameters are floating point 274 numbers—weights—that describe the connection. Positive numbers are an 275 excitatory connection. Negative numbers are inhibitory. 276 277 These models are built by feeding data through a tokeniser that breaks text 278 into tokens—often one word per token—that are ultimately fed into an algorithm. 279 That algorithm constructs the network, node by node, layer by layer, based on 280 the relationships it calculates between the tokens/words. This is done in 281 several runs and, usually, the developer of the model will evaluate after each 282 run that the model is progressing in the right direction, with some doing more 283 thorough evaluation at specific checkpoints. 284 285 The network is, in a very fundamental way, a mathematical derivation of the 286 language in the data. 287 288 A language model is constructed from the data. The transformer code regulates 289 and guides the process, but the distributions within the data set are what 290 defines the network. 291 292 This process takes time—both collecting and managing the data set and the build 293 process itself—which inevitably introduces a cut-off point for the data set. 294 For OpenAI and Anthropic, that cut-off point is in 2021. For Google’s PaLM2 295 it’s early 2023. 296 297 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 298 299 Aside: not a brain 300 301 This is very, very different from how a biological neural network interacts 302 with data. A biological brain is modified by input and data—its environment—but 303 its construction is derived from nutrition, its chemical environment, and 304 genetics. 305 306 The data set, conversely, is a deep and fundamental part of the language model. 307 The algorithm’s code provides the process while the weights themselves are 308 derived from the data, and the model itself is dead and static during input and 309 output. 310 311 The construction process of a neural network is called “training”, which is yet 312 another incredibly inaccurate term used by the industry. 313 314 • A pregnant mother isn’t “training” the fetus. 315 • A language model isn’t “trained” from the data, but constructed. 316 317 This is nonsense. 318 319 But this is the term that the AI industry uses, so we’re stuck with it. 320 321 A language model is a mathematical model built as a derivation of its training 322 data. There is no actual training, only construction. 323 324 This is also why it’s inaccurate to say that these systems are inspired by 325 their training data. Even though genes and nutrition make an artist’s mind they 326 are not in what any reasonable person would call “their inspiration”. Even when 327 they are sought out for study and genuine inspiration, it’s our representations 328 of our understanding of the genes that are the true source of inspiration. 329 Nobody sticks their hand in a gelatinous puddle of DNA and spontaneously gets 330 inspired by the data it encodes. 331 332 Training data are construction materials for a language models. A language 333 model can never be inspired. It is itself a cultural artefact derived from 334 other cultural artefacts. 335 336 The machine learning process is loosely based on decades-old grossly simplified 337 models of how brains work. 338 339 A biological neuron is a complex system in its own right—one of the more 340 complex cells in an animal’s body. In a living brain, a biological neuron will 341 use electricity, multiple different classes of neurotransmitters, and timing to 342 accomplish its function in ways that we still don’t fully understand. It even 343 has its own [19]built-in engine for chemical energy. 344 345 The brain as a whole is composed of not just a massive neural network, but also 346 layers of hormonal chemical networks that dynamically modify its function, both 347 granularly and as a whole. 348 349 The digital neuron—a single signed floating point number—is to a biological 350 neuron what a flat-head screwdriver is to a Tesla. 351 352 They both contain metal and that’s about the extent of their similarity. 353 354 The human brain contains roughly 100 billion neuron cells, a layered chemical 355 network, and a cerebrovascular system that all integrate as a whole to create a 356 functioning, self-aware system capable of general reasoning and autonomous 357 behaviour. This system is multiple orders of magnitude more complex than even 358 the largest language model to date, both in terms of individual neuron 359 structure, and taken as a whole. 360 361 It’s important to remember this so that we don’t fall for marketing claims that 362 constantly imply that these tools are fully functioning assistants. 363 364 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 365 366 The prompt 367 368 After all of this, we have a data set which can be used to generate text in 369 response to prompts. 370 371 Prompts such as: 372 373 Who was the first man on the moon? 374 375 The input phrase, or prompt, has no structure beyond the linguistic. It’s just 376 a blob of text. You can’t give the model commands or parameters separately from 377 other input. Because of this, if your model lets a third party enter text, an 378 attacker will always be able to bypass whatever restrictions you put on it. 379 Control prompts or prefixes will be discovered and countermanded. Delimiters 380 don’t work. Fine-tuning the model only limits the harm, but doesn’t prevent it. 381 382 This is called a prompt injection and what it means is that model input can’t 383 be secured. You have to assume that anybody that can send text to the model has 384 full access to it. 385 386 Language models need to be treated like an unsecured client and only very 387 carefully integrated into other systems. 388 389 The response 390 391 What you’re likely to get back from that prompt would be something like: 392 393 On July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong became the first human to step on the 394 moon. 395 396 This is NASA’s own phrasing. Most answers on the web are likely to be 397 variations on this, so the answer from a language model is likely to be so too. 398 399 • The moon landing happens to be a fact, but the language model only knows it 400 as a text. 401 402 The prompt we provided is strongly associated in the training data set with 403 other sentences that are all variations of NASA’s phrasing of the answer. The 404 model won’t answer with just “Neil Armstrong” because it isn’t actually 405 answering the question, it’s responding with the text that correlates with the 406 question. It doesn’t “know” anything. 407 408 • The language model is fabricating a mathematically plausible response, 409 based on word distributions in the training data. 410 • There are no facts in a language model or its output. Only memorised text. 411 412 It only fabricates. It’s all “hallucinations” all the way down. 413 414 Occasionally those fabrications correlate with facts, but that is a 415 mathematical quirk resulting from the fact that, on average, what people write 416 roughly correlates with their understanding of a factual reality, which in turn 417 roughly correlates with a factual reality. 418 419 A knowledge system? 420 421 To be able to answer that question and pass as a knowledge system, the model 422 needs to memorise the answer, or at least parts of the phrase. 423 424 Because “AI” vendors are performing a sleight-of-hand here and presenting 425 statistical language synthesis engines as knowledge retrieval systems, their 426 focus in training and testing is on “facts” and minimising “falsehoods”. The 427 model has no notion of either, as it’s entirely a language model, so the only 428 way to square this circle is for the model to memorise it all. 429 430 • To be able to answer a question factually, not “hallucinate”, and pass as a 431 knowledge system, the model needs to memorise the answer. 432 • The model doesn’t know facts, only text. 433 • If you want a fact from it, the model will need to memorise text that 434 correlates with that fact. 435 436 “Dr. AI”? 437 438 Vendors then compound this by using human exams as benchmarks for reasoning 439 performance. The problem is that bar exams, medical exams, and diagnosis tests 440 are specifically designed to mostly test rote memorisation. That’s what they’re 441 for. 442 443 The human brain is bad at rote memorisation and generally it only happens with 444 intensive work and practice. If you want to design a test that’s specifically 445 intended to verify that somebody has spent a large amount of time studying a 446 subject, you test for rote memorisation. 447 448 Many other benchmarks they use, such as those related to programming languages 449 also require memorisation, otherwise the systems would just constantly make up 450 APIs. 451 452 • Vendors use human exams as benchmarks. 453 • These are specifically designed to test rote memorisation, because that’s 454 hard for humans. 455 • Programming benchmarks also require memorisation. Otherwise, you’d only get 456 pseudocode. 457 458 Between the tailoring of these systems for knowledge retrieval, and the use of 459 rote memorisation exams and code generation as benchmarks, the tech industry 460 has created systems where memorisation is a core part of how they function. In 461 all research to date, memorisation has been key to language model performance 462 in a range of benchmarks.^[20][1] 463 464 If you’re familiar with storytelling devices, this here would be a [21] 465 Chekhov’s gun. Observe! The gun is above the mantelpiece: 466 467 👉🏻👉🏻 memorisation! 468 469 Make a note of it, because those finger guns are going to be fired later. 470 471 Biases 472 473 Beyond question and answer, these systems are great at generating the averagely 474 plausible text for a given prompt. In prose, current system output smells 475 vaguely of sweaty-but-quiet LinkedIn desperation and over-enthusiastic social 476 media. The general style will vary, but it’s always going to be the most 477 plausible style and response based on the training data. 478 479 One consequence of how these systems are made is that they are constantly 480 backwards-facing. Where brains are focused on the present, often to their 481 detriment, “AI” models are built using historical data. 482 483 The training data encompasses thousands of diverse voices, styles, structures, 484 and tones, but some word distributions will be more common in the set than 485 others and those will end up dominating the output. As a result, language 486 models tend to lean towards the “racist grandpa who has learned to speak fluent 487 LinkedIn” end of the spectrum.^[22][2] 488 489 This has implications for a whole host of use cases: 490 491 • Generated text is going to skew conservative in content and marketing copy 492 in structure and vocabulary. (Bigoted, prejudiced, but polite and 493 inoffensively phrased.) 494 • Even when the cut-off date for the data set is recent, it’s still going to 495 skew historical because what’s new is also comparatively smaller than the 496 old. 497 • Language models will always skew towards the more common, middling, 498 mediocre, and predictable. 499 • Because most of these models are trained on the web, much of which is 500 unhinged, violent, pornographic, and abusive, some of that language will be 501 represented in the output. 502 503 Modify, summarise, and “reason” 504 505 The superpower that these systems provide is conversion or modification. They 506 can, generally, take text and convert it to another style or structure. Take 507 this note and turn it into a formal prose, and it will! That’s amazing. I don’t 508 think that’s a trillion-dollar industry, but it’s a neat feature that will 509 definitely be useful. 510 511 They can summarise text too, but that’s much less reliable than you’d expect. 512 It unsurprisingly works best with text that already provides its own summary, 513 such as a newspaper article (first paragraphs always summarise the story), 514 academic paper (the abstract), or corporate writing (executive summary). 515 Anything that’s a mix of styles, voices, or has an unusual structure won’t work 516 as well. 517 518 What little reasoning they do is entirely based on finding through correlation 519 and re-enacting prior textual descriptions of reasoning. They fail utterly when 520 confronted with adversarial or novel examples. They also fail if you rephrase 521 the question so that it no longer correlates with the phrasing in the data set. 522 ^[23][3] 523 524 So, not actual reasoning. “Reasoning”, if you will. In other “AI” model genres 525 these correlations are often called “shortcuts”, which feels apt. 526 527 To summarise: 528 529 • Language models are a mathematical expression of the training data set. 530 • Have very little in common with human brains. 531 • Rely on inputs that can’t be secured. 532 • Lie. Everything they output is a fabrication. 533 • Memorise heavily. 534 • Great for modifying text. No sarcasm. Genuinely good at this. 535 • Occasionally useful for summarisation if you don’t mind being lied to 536 regularly. 537 • Don’t actually reason. 538 539 Why I believe “AI” for programming is a bad idea 540 541 If you recall from the start of this essay, I began my research into machine 542 learning and language models because I was curious to see if they could help 543 fix or improve the mess that is modern software development. 544 545 There was reason to be hopeful. Programming languages are more uniform and 546 structured than prose, so it’s not too unreasonable to expect that they might 547 lend themselves to language models. Programming language output can often be 548 tested directly, which might help with the evaluation of each training run. 549 550 Training a language model on code also seems to benefit the model. Models that 551 include substantial code in their data set tend to be better at correlative 552 “reasoning” (to a point, still not actual reasoning), which makes sense since 553 code is all about representing structured logic in text. 554 555 But, there is an inherent [24]Catch 22 to any attempt at fixing software 556 industry dysfunction with more software. The structure of the industry depends 557 entirely on variables that everybody pretends are proxies for end user value, 558 but generally aren’t. This will always tend to sabotage our efforts at 559 industrial self-improvement. 560 561 The more I studied language models as a technology the more flaws I found until 562 it became clear to me that odds are that the overall effect on software 563 development will be harmful. The problem starts with the models themselves. 564 565 1. Language models can’t be secured 566 567 This first issue has less to do with the use of language models for software 568 development and more to do with their use in software products, which is likely 569 to be a priority for many software companies over the next few years. 570 571 Prompt injections are not a solved problem. OpenAI has come up with a few 572 “solutions” in the past, but none of them actually worked. Everybody expects 573 this to be fixed, but nobody has a clue how. 574 575 Language models are fundamentally based on the idea that you give it text as 576 input and get text as output. It’s entirely possible that the only way to 577 completely fix this is to invent a completely new kind of language model and 578 spend a few years training it from scratch. 579 580 • A language model needs to be treated like an unsecured client. It’s about 581 as secure as a web page form. It’s vulnerable to a new generation of 582 injection vulnerabilities, both direct and indirect, that we still don’t 583 quite understand.^[25][4] 584 585 The training data set itself is also a security hazard. I’ve gone into this in 586 more detail elsewhere^[26][5], but the short version is that training data set 587 is vulnerable to keyword manipulation, both in terms of altering sentiment and 588 censorship. 589 590 Again, fully defending against this kind of attack would seem to require 591 inventing a completely new kind of language model. 592 593 Neither of these issues affect the use of language models for software 594 development, but it does affect our work because we’re the ones who will be 595 expected to integrate these systems into existing websites and products. 596 597 2. It encourages the worst of our management and development practices 598 599 A language model will never question, push back, doubt, hesitate, or waver. 600 601 Your managers are going to use it to flesh out and describe unworkable ideas, 602 and it won’t complain. The resulting spec won’t have any bearing with reality. 603 604 People on your team will do “user research” by asking a language model, which 605 it will do even though the resulting research will be fiction and entirely 606 useless. 607 608 It’ll let you implement the worst ideas ever in your code without protest. Ask 609 a copilot “how can I roll my own cryptography?” and it’ll regurgitate a 610 half-baked expression of sha1 in PHP for you. 611 612 Think of all the times you’ve had an idea for an approach, looked up how to do 613 it on the web, and found out that, no, this was a really bad idea? I have a 614 couple of those every week when I’m in the middle of a project. 615 616 Language models don’t deliver productivity improvements. They increase the 617 volume, unchecked by reason. 618 619 A core aspect of the theory-building model of software development is code that 620 developers don’t understand is a liability. It means your mental model of the 621 software is inaccurate which will lead you to create bugs as you modify it or 622 add other components that interact with pieces you don’t understand. 623 624 Language model tools for software development are specifically designed to 625 create large volumes of code that the programmer doesn’t understand. They are 626 liability engines for all but the most experienced developer. You can’t solve 627 this problem by having the “AI” understand the codebase and how its various 628 components interact with each other because a language model isn’t a mind. It 629 can’t have a mental model of anything. It only works through correlation. 630 631 These tools will indeed make you go faster, but it’s going to be accelerating 632 in the wrong direction. That is objectively worse than just standing still. 633 634 3. Its User Interfaces do not work, and we haven’t found interfaces that do 635 work 636 637 Human factors studies, the field responsible for designing cockpits and the 638 like, discovered that humans suffer from an automation bias. 639 640 What it means is that when you have cognitive automation—something that helps 641 you think less—you inevitably think less. That means that you are less critical 642 of the output than if you were doing it yourself. That’s potentially 643 catastrophic when the output is code, especially since the quality of the 644 generated code is, understandably considering how the system works, broadly on 645 the level of a novice developer.^[27][6] 646 647 Copilots and chatbots—exacerbated by anthropomorphism—seem to trigger our 648 automation biases. 649 650 Microsoft themselves have said that 40% of GitHub Copilot’s output is committed 651 unchanged.^[28][7] 652 653 Let’s not get into the question of how we, as an industry, put ourselves in the 654 position where Microsoft can follow a line of code from their language model, 655 through your text editor, and into your supposedly decentralised version 656 control system. 657 658 People overwhelmingly seem to trust the output of a language model. 659 660 If it runs without errors, it must be fine. 661 662 But that’s never the case. We all know this. We’ve all seen running code turn 663 out to be buggy as hell. But something in our mind switches off when we use 664 tools for cognitive automation. 665 666 4. It’s biased towards the stale and popular 667 668 The biases inherent in these language models are bad enough when it comes to 669 prose, but they become a functional problem in code. 670 671 • Its JS code will lean towards React and node, most of it several versions 672 old, and away from the less popular corners of the JS ecosystem. 673 • The code is, inevitably, more likely to be built around CommonJS modules 674 instead of the modern ESM modules. 675 • It won’t know much about Deno or Cloudflare Workers. 676 • It’ll always prefer older APIs over new. Most of these models won’t know 677 about any API or module released after 2021. This is going to be an issue 678 for languages such as Swift. 679 • New platforms and languages don’t exist to it. 680 • Existing data will outweigh deprecations and security issues. 681 • Popular but obsolete or outdated open source projects will always win out 682 over the up-to-date equivalent. 683 684 These systems live in the popular past, like the middle-aged man who doesn’t 685 realise he isn’t the popular kid at school any more. Everything he thinks is 686 cool is actually very much not cool. More the other thing. 687 688 This is an issue for software because our industry is entirely structured 689 around constant change. Software security hinges on it. All of our practices 690 are based on constant march towards the new and fancy. We go from framework to 691 framework to try and find the magic solution that will solve everything. In 692 some cases language models might help push back against that, but it’ll also 693 push back against all the very many changes that are necessary because the old 694 stuff turned out to be broken. 695 696 • The software industry is built on change. 697 • Language models are built on a static past. 698 699 5. No matter how the lawsuits go, this threatens the existence of free and open 700 source software 701 702 Many AI vendors are mired in lawsuits.^[29][8] 703 704 These lawsuits all concentrate on the relationship between the training data 705 set and the model and they do so from a variety of angles. Some are based on 706 contract and licensing law. Others are claiming that the models violate fair 707 use. It’s hard to predict how they will go. They might not all go the same way, 708 as laws will vary across industries and jurisdictions. 709 710 No matter the result, we’re likely to be facing a major decline in the free and 711 open source ecosystem. 712 713 1. All of these models are trained on open source code without payment or even 714 acknowledgement, which is a major disincentive for contributors and 715 maintainers. That large corporations might benefit from your code is a 716 fixture of open source, but they do occasionally give back to the 717 community. 718 2. Language models—built on open source code—commonly replace that code. 719 Instead of importing a module to do a thing, you prompt your Copilot. The 720 code generated is almost certainly based on the open source module, at 721 least partially, but it has been laundered through the language model, 722 disconnecting the programmer from the community, recognition, and what 723 little reward there was. 724 725 Language models demotivate maintainers and drain away both resources and users. 726 What you’re likely to be left with are those who are building core 727 infrastructure or end-user software out of principle. The “free software” side 728 of the community is more likely to survive than the rest. The Linux kernel, 729 Gnome, KDE—that sort of thing. 730 731 The “open source” ecosystem, especially that surrounding the web and node, is 732 likely to be hit the hardest. The more driven the open source project was by 733 its proximity to either an employed contributor or actively dependent business, 734 the bigger the impact from a shift to language models will be. 735 736 This is a serious problem for the software industry as arguably much of the 737 economic value the industry has provided over the past decade comes from 738 strip-mining open source and free software. 739 740 6. Licence contamination 741 742 Microsoft and Google don’t train their language models on their own code. 743 GitHub’s Copilot isn’t trained on code from Microsoft’s office suite, even 744 though many of its products are likely to be some of the largest React Native 745 projects in existence. There aren’t many C++ code bases as big as Windows. 746 Google’s repository is probably one of the biggest collection of python and 747 java code you can find. 748 749 They don’t seem to use it for training, but instead train on collections of 750 open source code that contain both permissive and copyleft licences. 751 752 Copyleft licences, if used, force you to release your own project under their 753 licence. Many of them, even non-copyleft, have patent clauses, which is poison 754 for quite a few employers. Even permissive licences require attribution, and 755 you can absolutely get sued if you’re caught copying open source code without 756 attribution. 757 758 Remember our Chekhov’s gun? 759 760 👉🏻👉🏻 memorisation! 761 762 Well, 👉🏻👉🏻 pewpew!!! 763 764 Turns out blindly copying open source code is problematic. Whodathunkit? 765 766 These models all memorise a lot, and they tend to copy what they memorise into 767 their output. [30]GitHub’s own numbers peg verbatim copies of code that’s at 768 least 150 characters at 1%^[31][9], which is roughly the same, in terms of 769 verbatim copying, as what you seem to get in other language models. 770 771 For context, that means that if you use a language model for development, a 772 copilot or chatbot, three or four times a day, you’re going to get a verbatim 773 copy of open source code injected into your project about once a month. If 774 every team member uses one, then multiply that by the size of the team. 775 776 GitHub’s Copilot has a feature that lets you block verbatim copies. This 777 obviously requires both a check, which slows the result down, and it will throw 778 out a bunch of useful results, making the language model less useful. It’s 779 already not as useful as it’s made out to be and pretty darn slow so many 780 people are going to turn off the “please don’t plagiarise” checkbox. 781 782 But even GitHub’s checks are insufficient. The keyword there is “verbatim”, 783 because language models have a tendency to rephrase their output. If GitHub 784 Copilot copies a GPLed implementation of an algorithm into your project but 785 changes all the variable names, Copilot won’t detect it, it’ll still be 786 plagiarism and the copied code is still under the GPL. This isn’t unlikely as 787 this is how language models work. Memorisation and then copying with light 788 rephrasing is what they do. 789 790 Training the system only on permissively licensed code doesn’t solve the 791 problem. It won’t force your project to adopt an MIT licence or anything like 792 that, but you can still be sued if it’s discovered. 793 794 This would seem to give Microsoft and GitHub a good reason not to train on the 795 Office code base, for example. If they did, there’s a good chance that a prompt 796 to generate DOCX parsing code might “generate” a verbatim copy of the DOCX 797 parsing code from Microsoft Word. 798 799 And they can’t have that, can they? This would both undercut their own 800 strategic advantage, and it would break the illusion that these systems are 801 generating novel code from scratch. 802 803 This should make it clear that what they’re actually doing is strip-mine the 804 free and open source software ecosystem. 805 806 How much of a problem is this? 807 808 —It won’t matter. I won’t get caught. 809 810 You personally won’t get caught, but your employer might, and Intellectual 811 Property scans or similar code audits tend to come up at the absolute worst 812 moments in the history of any given organisation: 813 814 • During due diligence for an acquisition. Could cost the company and 815 managers a fortune. 816 • In discovery for an unrelated lawsuit. Again, could cost the company a 817 fortune. 818 • During hacks and other security incidents. Could. Cost. A. Fortune. 819 820 “AI” vendors won’t take any responsibility for this risk. I doubt your business 821 insurance covers “automated language model plagiarism” lawsuits. 822 823 Language models for software development are a lawsuit waiting to happen. 824 825 Unless they are completely reinvented from scratch, language model code 826 generators are, in my opinion, unsuitable for anything except for prototypes 827 and throwaway projects. 828 829 So, obviously, everybody’s going to use them 830 831 • All the potentially bad stuff happens later. Unlikely to affect your 832 bonuses or employment. 833 • It’ll be years before the first licence contamination lawsuits happen. 834 • Most employees will be long gone before anybody realises just how much of a 835 bad idea it was. 836 • But you’ll still get that nice “AI” bump in the stock market. 837 838 What all of these problems have in common is that their impact is delayed and 839 most of them will only appear in the form of increased frequency of bugs and 840 other defects and general project chaos. 841 842 The biggest issue, licence contamination, will likely take years before it 843 starts to hit the industry, and is likely to be mitigated by virtue of the fact 844 that many of the heaviest users of “AI”-generated code will have folded due to 845 general mismanagement long before anybody cares enough to check their code. 846 847 If you were ever wondering if we, as an industry, were capable of coming up 848 with a systemic issue to rival the Y2K bug in scale and stupidity? Well, here 849 you go. 850 851 You can start using a language model, get the stock market bump, present the 852 short term increase in volume as productivity, and be long gone before anybody 853 connects the dots between language model use and the jump in defects. 854 855 Even if you purposefully tried to come up with a technology that played 856 directly into and magnified the software industry’s dysfunctions you wouldn’t 857 be able to come up with anything as perfectly imperfect as these language 858 models. 859 860 It’s nonsense without consequence. 861 862 Counterproductive novelty that you can indulge in without harming your career. 863 864 It might even do your career some good. Show that you’re embracing the future. 865 866 But… 867 868 The best is yet to come 869 870 In a few years’ time, once the effects of the “AI” bubble finally dissipates… 871 872 Somebody’s going to get paid to fix the crap it left behind. 873 874 The best way to support this newsletter or my blog is to buy one of my books, 875 [32]The Intelligence Illusion: a practical guide to the business risks of 876 Generative AI or [33]Out of the Software Crisis. Or, you can buy them both [34] 877 as a bundle. 878 879 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 880 881 1. There’s quite a bit of papers that either highlight the tendency to 882 memorise or demonstrate a strong relationship between that tendency and 883 eventual performance. 884 885 □ [35]An Empirical Study of Memorization in NLP (Zheng & Jiang, ACL 2022) 886 □ [36]Does learning require memorization? a short tale about a long tail. 887 (Feldman, 2020) 888 □ [37]When is memorization of irrelevant training data necessary for 889 high-accuracy learning? (Brown et al. 2021) 890 □ [38]What Neural Networks Memorize and Why: Discovering the Long Tail 891 via Influence Estimation (Feldman & Zhang, 2020) 892 □ [39]Question and Answer Test-Train Overlap in Open-Domain Question 893 Answering Datasets (Lewis et al., EACL 2021) 894 □ [40]Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Models (Carlini et 895 al. 2022) 896 □ [41]On Training Sample Memorization: Lessons from Benchmarking 897 Generative Modeling with a Large-scale Competition (Bai et al. 2021) 898 [42]↩︎ 899 2. See the [43]Bias & Safety card at [44]needtoknow.fyi for references. [45]↩︎ 900 901 3. See the [46]Shortcut “Reasoning” card at [47]needtoknow.fyi for references. 902 [48]↩︎ 903 904 4. Simon Willison has been covering this issue [49]in a series of blog posts. 905 [50]↩︎ 906 907 5. 908 □ [51]The poisoning of ChatGPT 909 □ [52]Google Bard is a glorious reinvention of black-hat SEO spam and 910 keyword-stuffing 911 [53]↩︎ 912 6. See, for example: 913 914 □ [54]Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot’s 915 Code Contributions (Hammond Pearce et al., December 2021) 916 □ [55]Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants? (Neil Perry 917 et al., December 2022) 918 [56]↩︎ 919 7. This came out [57]during an investor event and was presented as evidence of 920 the high quality of Copilot’s output. [58]↩︎ 921 922 8. 923 □ [59]Getty Images v. Stability AI - Complaint 924 □ [60]Getty Images is suing the creators of AI art tool Stable Diffusion 925 for scraping its content 926 □ [61]The Wave of AI Lawsuits Have Begun 927 □ [62]Copyright lawsuits pose a serious threat to generative AI 928 □ [63]GitHub Copilot litigation 929 □ [64]Stable Diffusion litigation 930 [65]↩︎ 931 9. Archived link of the [66]GitHub Copilot feature page. [67]↩︎ 932 933 Join the Newsletter 934 935 Subscribe to the Out of the Software Crisis newsletter to get my weekly (at 936 least) essays on how to avoid or get out of software development crises. 937 938 Join now and get a free PDF of three bonus essays from Out of the Software 939 Crisis. 940 941 [68][ ] 942 Subscribe 943 944 We respect your privacy. 945 946 Unsubscribe at any time. 947 948 [70]Mastodon [71]Twitter [72]GitHub [73]Feed 949 950 References: 951 952 [1] https://softwarecrisis.dev/ 953 [2] https://softwarecrisis.dev/ 954 [3] https://softwarecrisis.baldurbjarnason.com/ 955 [4] https://illusion.baldurbjarnason.com/ 956 [5] https://softwarecrisis.dev/archive/ 957 [6] https://softwarecrisis.dev/author/ 958 [7] https://www.hakkavelin.is/ 959 [8] https://illusion.baldurbjarnason.com/ 960 [9] https://softwarecrisis.baldurbjarnason.com/ 961 [10] https://baldurbjarnason.lemonsqueezy.com/checkout/buy/cfc2f2c6-34af-436f-91c1-cb2e47283c40 962 [11] 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