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[1]Skip to the content
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[2][noema-logo]
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[3]Subscribe
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[4] Published
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by the
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Berggruen
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Institute
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Topics
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• [5]Technology & the Human
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• [6]Future of Capitalism
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• [7]Philosophy & Culture
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• [8]Climate Crisis
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• [9]Geopolitics & Deglobalization
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• [10]Future of Democracy
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• [11]Digital Society
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• [12]Read Noema In Print
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Search
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[13][ ]
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Go
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The Last Days Of Social Media
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Social media promised connection, but it has delivered exhaustion.
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Illustration by Daniel Barreto. Illustration by Daniel Barreto.
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Daniel Barreto
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[15]Essay[16]Digital Society
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By [17]James O'Sullivan September 2, 2025
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[18][19][20][21][22]
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Credits
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James O’Sullivan lectures in the School of English and Digital Humanities at
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University College Cork, where his work explores the intersection of technology
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and culture.
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At first glance, the feed looks familiar, a seamless carousel of “For You”
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updates gliding beneath your thumb. But déjà‑vu sets in as 10 posts from 10
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different accounts carry the same stock portrait and the same breathless
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promise — “click here for free pics” or “here is the one productivity hack you
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need in 2025.” Swipe again and three near‑identical replies appear, each from a
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pout‑filtered avatar directing you to “free pics.” Between them sits an ad for
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a cash‑back crypto card.
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Scroll further and recycled TikTok clips with “original audio” bleed into Reels
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on Facebook and Instagram; AI‑stitched football highlights showcase players’
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limbs bending like marionettes. Refresh once more, and the woman who enjoys
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your snaps of sushi rolls has seemingly spawned five clones.
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Whatever remains of genuine, human content is increasingly sidelined by
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algorithmic prioritization, receiving fewer interactions than the engineered
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content and AI slop optimized solely for clicks.
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These are the last days of social media as we know it.
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Drowning The Real
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Social media was built on the romance of authenticity. Early platforms sold
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themselves as conduits for genuine connection: stuff you wanted to see, like
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your friend’s wedding and your cousin’s dog.
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Even influencer culture, for all its artifice, promised that behind the
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ring‑light stood an actual person. But the attention economy, and more
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recently, the generative AI-fueled late attention economy, have broken whatever
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social contract underpinned that illusion. The feed no longer feels crowded
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with people but crowded with content. At this point, it has far less to do with
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people than with consumers and consumption.
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In recent years, Facebook and other platforms that facilitate billions of daily
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interactions have slowly morphed into the internet’s largest repositories of
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[23]AI‑generated spam. Research has found what users plainly see: tens of
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thousands of machine‑written posts [24]now flood public groups — pushing scams,
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chasing clicks — with [25]clickbait headlines, half‑coherent listicles and hazy
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lifestyle images stitched together in AI tools like Midjourney.
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It’s all just vapid, empty shit produced for engagement’s sake. Facebook is
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“sloshing” in low-effort AI-generated posts, as Arwa Mahdawi [26]notes in The
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Guardian; some even bolstered by algorithmic boosts, like “[27]Shrimp Jesus.”
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The difference between human and synthetic content is becoming increasingly
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indistinguishable, and platforms seem unable, or uninterested, in trying to
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police it. Earlier this year, CEO Steve Huffman pledged to “[28]keep Reddit
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human,” a tacit admission that floodwaters were already lapping at the last
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high ground. TikTok, meanwhile, [29]swarms with AI narrators presenting
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concocted news reports and [30]“what‑if” histories. A few creators do append
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labels disclaiming that their videos depict “no real events,” but many creators
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don’t bother, and many consumers don’t seem to care.
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The problem is not just the rise of fake material, but the collapse of context
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and the acceptance that truth no longer matters as long as our cravings for
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colors and noise are satisfied. Contemporary social media content is more often
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rootless, detached from cultural memory, interpersonal exchange or shared
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conversation. It arrives fully formed, optimized for attention rather than
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meaning, producing a kind of semantic sludge, posts that look like language yet
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say almost nothing.
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We’re drowning in this nothingness.
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The Bot-Girl Economy
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If spam (AI or otherwise) is the white noise of the modern timeline, its
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dominant melody is a different form of automation: the hyper‑optimized,
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sex‑adjacent human avatar. She appears everywhere, replying to trending tweets
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with selfies, promising “funny memes in bio” and linking, inevitably, to
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OnlyFans or one of its proxies. Sometimes she is real. Sometimes she is not.
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Sometimes she is a he, sitting in a [31]compound in Myanmar. Increasingly, it
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makes no difference.
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This convergence of bots, scammers, brand-funnels and soft‑core marketing
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underpins what might be called the bot-girl economy, a parasocial marketplace
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[32]fueled in a large part by economic precarity. At its core is a
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transactional logic: Attention is scarce, intimacy is monetizable and platforms
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generally won’t intervene so long as engagement [33]stays high. As more women
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now turn to online sex work, lots of men are eager to pay them for their
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services. And as these workers try to cope with the precarity imposed by
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platform metrics and competition, some can spiral, forever downward, into a
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transactional attention-to-intimacy logic that eventually turns them into more
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bot than human. To hold attention, some creators increasingly opt to behave
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like algorithms themselves, [34]automating replies, optimizing content for
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engagement, or mimicking affection at scale. The distinction between
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performance and intention must surely erode as real people perform as synthetic
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avatars and synthetic avatars mimic real women.
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There is loneliness, desperation and predation everywhere.
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“Genuine, human content is increasingly sidelined by algorithmic
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prioritization, receiving fewer interactions than the engineered content
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and AI slop optimized solely for clicks.”
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The bot-girl is more than just a symptom; she is a proof of concept for how
|
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social media bends even aesthetics to the logic of engagement. Once, profile
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pictures (both real and synthetic) aspired to hyper-glamor, unreachable beauty
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filtered through fantasy. But that fantasy began to underperform as average men
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sensed the ruse, recognizing that supermodels typically don’t send them DMs.
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And so, the system adapted, surfacing profiles that felt more plausible, more
|
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emotionally available. Today’s avatars project a curated accessibility: They’re
|
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attractive but not flawless, styled to suggest they might genuinely be
|
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interested in you. It’s a calibrated effect, just human enough to convey
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plausibility, just artificial enough to scale. She has to look more human to
|
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stay afloat, but act more bot to keep up. Nearly everything is socially
|
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engineered for maximum interaction: the like, the comment, the click, the
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private message.
|
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Once seen as the fringe economy of cam sites, OnlyFans has become the dominant
|
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digital marketplace for sex workers. In 2023, the then-seven-year-old platform
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[35]generated $6.63 billion in gross payments from fans, with $658 million in
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profit before tax. Its success has bled across the social web; platforms like X
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(formerly Twitter) now serve as de facto marketing layers for OnlyFans
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creators, with thousands of accounts running fan-funnel operations, [36]baiting
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users into paid subscriptions.
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The tools of seduction are also changing. One 2024 study [37]estimated that
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thousands of X accounts use AI to generate fake profile photos. Many content
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creators have also [38]begun using AI for talking-head videos, [39]synthetic
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voices or endlessly varied selfies. Content is likely A/B tested for
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click-through rates. Bios are written with conversion in mind. DMs are
|
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automated or [40]outsourced to AI impersonators. For users, the effect is a
|
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strange hybrid of influencer, chatbot and parasitic marketing loop. One minute
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you’re arguing politics, the next, you’re being pitched a girlfriend experience
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by a bot.
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Engagement In Freefall
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While content proliferates, engagement is evaporating. Average interaction
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rates across major platforms are declining fast: Facebook and X posts now
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scrape an average 0.15% engagement, while Instagram has dropped 24%
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year-on-year. Even TikTok has [41]begun to plateau. People aren’t connecting or
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conversing on social media like they used to; they’re just wading through slop,
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that is, low-effort, low-quality content produced at scale, often with AI, for
|
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engagement.
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And much of it is slop: Less than half of American adults [42]now rate the
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information they see on social media as “mostly reliable”— down from roughly
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two-thirds in the mid-2010s. Young adults register the steepest collapse,
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which is unsurprising; as digital natives, they better understand that the
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content they scroll upon wasn’t necessarily produced by humans. And yet, they
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continue to scroll.
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The timeline is no longer a source of information or social presence, but more
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of a mood-regulation device, endlessly replenishing itself with just enough
|
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novelty to suppress the anxiety of stopping. Scrolling has become a form of
|
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ambient dissociation, half-conscious, half-compulsive, closer to scratching an
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itch than seeking anything in particular. People know the feed is fake, they
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just don’t care.
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Platforms have little incentive to stem the tide. Synthetic accounts are cheap,
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tireless and lucrative because they never demand wages or unionize. Systems
|
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designed to surface peer-to-peer engagement are now systematically filtering
|
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out such activity, because what counts as engagement has changed. Engagement is
|
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now about raw user attention – time spent, impressions, scroll velocity – and
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the net effect is an online world in which you are constantly being addressed
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but never truly spoken to.
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|
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The Great Unbundling
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Social media’s death rattle will not be a bang but a shrug.
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||||
These networks once promised a single interface for the whole of online life:
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Facebook as social hub, Twitter as news‑wire, YouTube as broadcaster, Instagram
|
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as photo album, TikTok as distraction engine. Growth appeared inexorable. But
|
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now, the model is splintering, and users are drifting toward smaller, slower,
|
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more private spaces, like group chats, Discord servers and [43]federated
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microblogs — a billion little gardens.
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Since Elon Musk’s takeover, X has [44]shed at least 15% of its global user
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base. Meta’s Threads, launched with great fanfare in 2023, saw its number of
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daily active users collapse within a month, [45]falling from around 50 million
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active Android users at launch in July to only 10 million active users the
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following August. Twitch [46]recorded its lowest monthly watch-time in over
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four years in December 2024, just 1.58 billion hours, 11% lower than the
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December average from 2020-23.
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||||
“While content proliferates, engagement is evaporating.”
|
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|
||||
Even the giants that still command vast audiences are no longer growing
|
||||
exponentially. Many platforms have already died (Vine, Google+, Yik Yak), are
|
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functionally dead or zombified (Tumblr, Ello), or have been revived and died
|
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again (MySpace, Bebo). Some notable exceptions aside, like Reddit and BlueSky
|
||||
(though it’s still early days for the latter), growth has plateaued across the
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board. While social media adoption continues to rise overall, it’s no longer
|
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explosive. [47]As of early 2025, around 5.3 billion user identities — roughly
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65% of the global population — are on social platforms, but annual growth has
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decelerated to just 4-5%, a steep drop from the double-digit surges seen
|
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earlier in the 2010s.
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Intentional, opt-in micro‑communities are rising in their place — like Patreon
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collectives and Substack newsletters — where creators chase depth over scale,
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retention over virality. A writer with 10,000 devoted subscribers can
|
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potentially earn more and burn out less than one with a million passive
|
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followers on Instagram.
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|
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But the old practices are still evident: Substack is full of personal brands
|
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announcing their journeys, Discord servers host influencers disguised as
|
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community leaders and Patreon bios promise exclusive access that is often just
|
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recycled content. Still, something has shifted. These are not mass arenas; they
|
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are clubs — opt-in spaces with boundaries, where people remember who you are.
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And they are often paywalled, or at least heavily moderated, which at the very
|
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least keeps the bots out. What’s being sold is less a product than a sense of
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proximity, and while the economics may be similar, the affective atmosphere is
|
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different, smaller, slower, more reciprocal. In these spaces, creators don’t
|
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chase virality; they cultivate trust.
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|
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Even the big platforms sense the turning tide. Instagram has begun emphasizing
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DMs, X is pushing subscriber‑only circles and TikTok is experimenting with
|
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private communities. Behind these developments is an implicit acknowledgement
|
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that the infinite scroll, stuffed with bots and synthetic sludge, is
|
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approaching the limit of what humans will tolerate. A lot of people [48]seem to
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be fine with slop, but as more start to crave authenticity, the platforms will
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be forced to take note.
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From Attention To Exhaustion
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The social internet was built on attention, not only the promise to capture
|
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yours but the chance for you to capture a slice of everyone else’s. After two
|
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decades, the mechanism has inverted, replacing connection with exhaustion.
|
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“Dopamine detox” and “digital Sabbath” have entered the mainstream. In the
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U.S., [49]a significant proportion of 18‑ to 34‑year‑olds took deliberate
|
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breaks from social media in 2024, citing mental health as the motivation,
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according to an American Psychiatric Association poll. And yet, time spent on
|
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the platforms remains high — people scroll not because they enjoy it, but
|
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because they don’t know how to stop. Self-help influencers now recommend weekly
|
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“no-screen Sundays” (yes, the irony). The mark of the hipster is no longer an
|
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ill-fitting beanie but an old-school Nokia dumbphone.
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[50]Some creators are quitting, too. Competing with synthetic performers who
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never sleep, they find the visibility race not merely tiring but absurd. Why
|
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post a selfie when an AI can generate a prettier one? Why craft a thought when
|
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ChatGPT can produce one faster?
|
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|
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These are the last days of social media, not because we lack content, but
|
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because the attention economy has neared its outer limit — we have exhausted
|
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the capacity to care. There is more to watch, read, click and react to than
|
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ever before — an endless buffet of stimulation. But novelty has become
|
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indistinguishable from noise. Every scroll brings more, and each addition
|
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subtracts meaning. We are indeed drowning. In this saturation, even the most
|
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outrageous or emotive content struggles to provoke more than a blink.
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Outrage fatigues. Irony flattens. Virality cannibalizes itself. The feed no
|
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longer surprises but sedates, and in that sedation, something quietly breaks,
|
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and social media no longer feels like a place to be; it is a surface to skim.
|
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|
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No one is forcing anyone to go on TikTok or to consume the clickbait in their
|
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feeds. The content served to us by algorithms is, in effect, a warped mirror,
|
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reflecting and distorting our worst impulses. For younger users in particular,
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their scrolling of social media can [51]become compulsive, rewarding [52]their
|
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developing brains with unpredictable hits of dopamine that keep them glued to
|
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their screens.
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[53]Read Noema in print.
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Social media platforms have also achieved something more elegant than coercion:
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They’ve made non-participation a form of self-exile, a luxury available only to
|
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those who can afford its costs.
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|
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“Why post a selfie when an AI can generate a prettier one? Why craft a
|
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thought when ChatGPT can produce one faster?”
|
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|
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Our offline reality is irrevocably shaped by our online world: Consider the
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worker who deletes or was never on LinkedIn, excluding themselves from
|
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professional networks that increasingly exist nowhere else; or the small
|
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business owner who abandons Instagram, watching customers drift toward
|
||||
competitors who maintain their social media presence. The teenager who refuses
|
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TikTok may find herself unable to parse references, memes and microcultures
|
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that soon constitute her peers’ vernacular.
|
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|
||||
These platforms haven’t just captured attention, they’ve enclosed the commons
|
||||
where social, economic and cultural capital are exchanged. But enclosure breeds
|
||||
resistance, and as exhaustion sets in, alternatives begin to emerge.
|
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|
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Architectures Of Intention
|
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|
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The successor to mass social media is, as already noted, emerging not as a
|
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single platform, but as a scattering of alleyways, salons, encrypted lounges
|
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and federated town squares — those little gardens.
|
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|
||||
Maybe today’s major social media platforms will find new ways to hold the gaze
|
||||
of the masses, or maybe they will continue to decline in relevance, lingering
|
||||
like derelict shopping centers or a dying online game, haunted by bots and the
|
||||
echo of once‑human chatter. Occasionally we may wander back, out of habit or
|
||||
nostalgia, or to converse once more as a crowd, among the ruins. But as social
|
||||
media collapses on itself, the future points to a quieter, more fractured, more
|
||||
human web, something that no longer promises to be everything, everywhere, for
|
||||
everyone.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a good thing. Group chats and invite‑only circles are where context and
|
||||
connection survive. These are spaces defined less by scale than by shared
|
||||
understanding, where people no longer perform for an algorithmic audience but
|
||||
speak in the presence of chosen others. Messaging apps like Signal are quietly
|
||||
[54]becoming dominant infrastructures for digital social life, not because they
|
||||
promise discovery, but because they don’t. In these spaces, a message often
|
||||
carries more meaning because it is usually directed, not broadcast.
|
||||
|
||||
Social media’s current logic is designed to reduce friction, to give users
|
||||
infinite content for instant gratification, or at the very least, the
|
||||
anticipation of such. The antidote to this compulsive, numbing overload will be
|
||||
found in deliberative friction, design patterns that introduce pause and
|
||||
reflection into digital interaction, or platforms and algorithms that create
|
||||
space for intention.
|
||||
|
||||
This isn’t about making platforms needlessly cumbersome but about
|
||||
distinguishing between helpful constraints and extractive ones. Consider [55]
|
||||
Are.na, a non-profit, ad-free creative platform founded in 2014 for collecting
|
||||
and connecting ideas that feels like the anti-Pinterest: There’s no algorithmic
|
||||
feed or engagement metrics, no trending tab to fall into and no infinite
|
||||
scroll. The pace is glacial by social media standards. Connections between
|
||||
ideas must be made manually, and thus, thoughtfully — there are no algorithmic
|
||||
suggestions or ranked content.
|
||||
|
||||
To demand intention over passive, mindless screen time, X could require a
|
||||
90-second delay before posting replies, not to deter participation, but to curb
|
||||
reactive broadcasting and engagement farming. Instagram could show how long
|
||||
you’ve spent scrolling before allowing uploads of posts or stories, and
|
||||
Facebook could display the carbon cost of its data centers, reminding users
|
||||
that digital actions have material consequences, with each refresh. These small
|
||||
added moments of friction and purposeful interruptions — what UX designers
|
||||
currently optimize away — are precisely what we need to break the cycle of
|
||||
passive consumption and restore intention to digital interaction.
|
||||
|
||||
We can dream of a digital future where belonging is no longer measured by
|
||||
follower counts or engagement rates, but rather by the development of trust and
|
||||
the quality of conversation. We can dream of a digital future in which
|
||||
communities form around shared interests and mutual care rather than
|
||||
algorithmic prediction. Our public squares — the big algorithmic platforms —
|
||||
will never be cordoned off entirely, but they might sit alongside countless
|
||||
semi‑public parlors where people choose their company and set their own rules,
|
||||
spaces that prioritize continuity over reach and coherence over chaos. People
|
||||
will show up not to go viral, but to be seen in context. None of this is about
|
||||
escaping the social internet, but about reclaiming its scale, pace, and
|
||||
purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
Governance Scaffolding
|
||||
|
||||
The most radical redesign of social media might be the most familiar: What if
|
||||
we treated these platforms as [56]public utilities rather than private casinos?
|
||||
|
||||
A public-service model wouldn’t require state control; rather, it could be
|
||||
governed through civic charters, much like public broadcasters operate under
|
||||
mandates that balance independence and accountability. This vision stands in
|
||||
stark contrast to the current direction of most major platforms, which are
|
||||
becoming increasingly opaque.
|
||||
|
||||
“Non-participation [is] a form of self-exile, a luxury available only to
|
||||
those who can afford its costs.”
|
||||
|
||||
In recent years, Reddit and X, among other platforms, have either restricted or
|
||||
removed API access, dismantling open-data pathways. The very infrastructures
|
||||
that shape public discourse are retreating from public access and oversight.
|
||||
Imagine social media platforms with transparent algorithms subject to public
|
||||
audit, user representation on governance boards, revenue models based on public
|
||||
funding or member dues rather than surveillance advertising, mandates to serve
|
||||
democratic discourse rather than maximize engagement, and regular impact
|
||||
assessments that measure not just usage but societal effects.
|
||||
|
||||
Some initiatives gesture in this direction. Meta’s Oversight Board, for
|
||||
example, frames itself as an independent body for content moderation appeals,
|
||||
though its remit is narrow and its influence ultimately limited by Meta’s
|
||||
discretion. X’s Community Notes, meanwhile, allows user-generated fact-checks
|
||||
but relies on opaque scoring mechanisms and lacks formal accountability. Both
|
||||
are add-ons to existing platform logic rather than systemic redesigns. A true
|
||||
public-service model would bake accountability into the platform’s
|
||||
infrastructure, not just bolt it on after the fact.
|
||||
|
||||
The European Union has begun exploring this territory through its Digital
|
||||
Markets Act and Digital Services Act, but these laws, enacted in 2022, largely
|
||||
focus on regulating existing platforms rather than imagining new ones. In the
|
||||
United States, efforts are more fragmented. Proposals such as the Platform
|
||||
Accountability and Transparency Act (PATA) and state-level laws in California
|
||||
and New York aim to increase oversight of algorithmic systems, particularly
|
||||
where they impact youth and mental health. Still, most of these measures seek
|
||||
to retrofit accountability onto current platforms. What we need are spaces
|
||||
built from the ground up on different principles, where incentives align with
|
||||
human interest rather than extractive, for-profit ends.
|
||||
|
||||
This could take multiple forms, like municipal platforms for local civic
|
||||
engagement, professionally focused networks run by trade associations, and
|
||||
educational spaces managed by public library systems. The key is diversity,
|
||||
delivering an ecosystem of civic digital spaces that each serve specific
|
||||
communities with transparent governance.
|
||||
|
||||
Of course, publicly governed platforms aren’t immune to their own risks. State
|
||||
involvement can bring with it the threat of politicization, censorship or
|
||||
propaganda, and this is why the governance question must be treated as
|
||||
infrastructural, rather than simply institutional. Just as public broadcasters
|
||||
in many democracies operate under charters that insulate them from partisan
|
||||
interference, civic digital spaces would require independent oversight, clear
|
||||
ethical mandates, and democratically accountable governance boards, not
|
||||
centralized state control. The goal is not to build a digital ministry of
|
||||
truth, but to create pluralistic public utilities: platforms built for
|
||||
communities, governed by communities and held to standards of transparency,
|
||||
rights protection and civic purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
The technical architecture of the next social web is already emerging through
|
||||
federated and distributed protocols like ActivityPub (used by Mastodon and
|
||||
Threads) and Bluesky’s [57]Authenticated Transfer (AT) Protocol, or atproto, (a
|
||||
decentralised framework that allows users to move between platforms while
|
||||
keeping their identity and social graph) as well as various blockchain-based
|
||||
experiments, [58]like Lens and [59]Farcaster.
|
||||
|
||||
But protocols alone won’t save us. The email protocol is decentralized, yet
|
||||
most email flows through a handful of corporate providers. We need to “[60]
|
||||
rewild the internet,” as Maria Farrell and Robin Berjon mentioned in a Noema
|
||||
essay. We need governance scaffolding, shared institutions that make
|
||||
decentralization viable at scale. Think credit unions for the social web that
|
||||
function as member-owned entities providing the infrastructure that individual
|
||||
users can’t maintain alone. These could offer shared moderation services that
|
||||
smaller instances can subscribe to, universally portable identity systems that
|
||||
let users move between platforms without losing their history, collective
|
||||
bargaining power for algorithm transparency and data rights, user data
|
||||
dividends for all, not just influencers (if platforms profit from our data, we
|
||||
should share in those profits), and algorithm choice interfaces that let users
|
||||
select from different recommender systems.
|
||||
|
||||
Bluesky’s AT Protocol explicitly allows users to port identity and social
|
||||
graphs, but it’s very early days and cross-protocol and platform portability
|
||||
remains extremely limited, if not effectively non-existent. Bluesky also allows
|
||||
users to choose among multiple content algorithms, an important step toward
|
||||
user control. But these models remain largely tied to individual platforms and
|
||||
developer communities. What’s still missing is a civic architecture that makes
|
||||
algorithmic choice universal, portable, auditable and grounded in
|
||||
public-interest governance rather than market dynamics alone.
|
||||
|
||||
Imagine being able to toggle between different ranking logics: a chronological
|
||||
feed, where posts appear in real time; a mutuals-first algorithm that
|
||||
privileges content from people who follow you back; a local context filter that
|
||||
surfaces posts from your geographic region or language group; a serendipity
|
||||
engine designed to introduce you to unfamiliar but diverse content; or even a
|
||||
human-curated layer, like playlists or editorials built by trusted institutions
|
||||
or communities. Many of these recommender models do exist, but they are rarely
|
||||
user-selectable, and almost never transparent or accountable. Algorithm choice
|
||||
shouldn’t require a hack or browser extension; it should be built into the
|
||||
architecture as a civic right, not a hidden setting.
|
||||
|
||||
“What if we treated these platforms as public utilities rather than private
|
||||
casinos?”
|
||||
|
||||
Algorithmic choice can also develop new hierarchies. If feeds can be curated
|
||||
like playlists, the next influencer may not be the one creating content, but
|
||||
editing it. Institutions, celebrities and brands will be best positioned to
|
||||
build and promote their own recommendation systems. For individuals, the
|
||||
incentive to do this curatorial work will likely depend on reputation,
|
||||
relational capital or ideological investment. Unless we design these systems
|
||||
with care, we risk reproducing old dynamics of platform power, just in a new
|
||||
form.
|
||||
|
||||
Federated platforms like Mastodon and Bluesky face [61]real tensions between
|
||||
autonomy and safety: Without centralized moderation, harmful content can
|
||||
proliferate, while over-reliance on volunteer admins creates sustainability
|
||||
problems at scale. These networks also risk reinforcing ideological silos, as
|
||||
communities block or mute one another, fragmenting the very idea of a shared
|
||||
public square. Decentralization gives users more control, but it also raises
|
||||
difficult questions about governance, cohesion and collective responsibility —
|
||||
questions that any humane digital future will have to answer.
|
||||
|
||||
But there is a possible future where a user, upon opening an app, is asked how
|
||||
they would like to see the world on a given day. They might choose the
|
||||
serendipity engine for unexpected connections, the focus filter for deep reads
|
||||
or the local lens for community news. This is technically very achievable — the
|
||||
data would be the same; the algorithms would just need to be slightly tweaked —
|
||||
but it would require a design philosophy that treats users as citizens of a
|
||||
shared digital system rather than cattle. While this is possible, it can feel
|
||||
like a pipe dream.
|
||||
|
||||
To make algorithmic choice more than a thought experiment, we need to change
|
||||
the incentives that govern platform design. Regulation can help, but real
|
||||
change will come when platforms are rewarded for serving the public interest.
|
||||
This could mean tying tax breaks or public procurement eligibility to the
|
||||
implementation of transparent, user-controllable algorithms. It could mean
|
||||
funding research into alternative recommender systems and making those tools
|
||||
open-source and interoperable. Most radically, it could involve certifying
|
||||
platforms based on civic impact, rewarding those that prioritize user autonomy
|
||||
and trust over sheer engagement.
|
||||
|
||||
Digital Literacy As Public Health
|
||||
|
||||
Perhaps most crucially, we need to reframe digital literacy not as an
|
||||
individual responsibility but as a collective capacity. This means moving
|
||||
beyond spot-the-fake-news workshops to more fundamental efforts to understand
|
||||
how algorithms shape perception and how design patterns exploit our cognitive
|
||||
processes.
|
||||
|
||||
Some education systems are [62]beginning to respond, embedding digital and
|
||||
media literacy across curricula. Researchers and educators argue that this work
|
||||
needs to begin in early childhood and continue through secondary education as a
|
||||
core competency. The goal is to equip students to critically examine the
|
||||
digital environments they inhabit daily, to [63]become active participants in
|
||||
shaping the future of digital culture rather than passive consumers. This
|
||||
includes what some call algorithmic literacy, the ability to understand how
|
||||
recommender systems work, how content is ranked and surfaced, and how personal
|
||||
data is used to shape what you see — and what you don’t.
|
||||
|
||||
Teaching this at scale would mean treating digital literacy as public
|
||||
infrastructure, not just a skill set for individuals, but a form of shared
|
||||
civic defense. This would involve long-term investments in teacher training,
|
||||
curriculum design and support for public institutions, such as libraries and
|
||||
schools, to serve as digital literacy hubs. When we build collective capacity,
|
||||
we begin to lay the foundations for a digital culture grounded in
|
||||
understanding, context and care.
|
||||
|
||||
We also need behavioral safeguards like default privacy settings that protect
|
||||
rather than expose, mandatory cooling-off periods for viral content
|
||||
(deliberately slowing the spread of posts that suddenly attract high
|
||||
engagement), algorithmic impact assessments before major platform changes and
|
||||
public dashboards that show platform manipulation, that is, coordinated or
|
||||
deceptive behaviors that distort how content is amplified or suppressed, in
|
||||
real-time. If platforms are forced to disclose their engagement tactics, these
|
||||
tactics lose power. The ambition is to make visible hugely influential systems
|
||||
that currently operate in obscurity.
|
||||
|
||||
We need to build new digital spaces grounded in different principles, but this
|
||||
isn’t an either-or proposition. We also must reckon with the scale and
|
||||
entrenchment of existing platforms that still structure much of public life.
|
||||
Reforming them matters too. Systemic safeguards may not address the core
|
||||
incentives that inform platform design, but they can mitigate harm in the short
|
||||
term. The work, then, is to constrain the damage of the current system while
|
||||
constructing better ones in parallel, to contain what we have, even as we
|
||||
create what we need.
|
||||
|
||||
The choice isn’t between technological determinism and Luddite retreat; it’s
|
||||
about constructing alternatives that learn from what made major platforms
|
||||
usable and compelling while rejecting the extractive mechanics that turned
|
||||
those features into tools for exploitation. This won’t happen through
|
||||
individual choice, though choice helps; it also won’t happen through
|
||||
regulation, though regulation can really help. It will require our collective
|
||||
imagination to envision and build systems focused on serving human flourishing
|
||||
rather than harvesting human attention.
|
||||
|
||||
Social media as we know it is dying, but we’re not condemned to its ruins. We
|
||||
are capable of building better — smaller, slower, more intentional, more
|
||||
accountable — spaces for digital interaction, spaces where the metrics that
|
||||
matter aren’t engagement and growth but understanding and connection, where
|
||||
algorithms serve the community rather than strip-mining it.
|
||||
|
||||
The last days of social media might be the first days of something more human:
|
||||
a web that remembers why we came online in the first place — not to be
|
||||
harvested but to be heard, not to go viral but to find our people, not to
|
||||
scroll but to connect. We built these systems, and we can certainly build
|
||||
better ones. The question is whether we will do this or whether we will
|
||||
continue to drown.
|
||||
|
||||
[64]Enjoy the read? Subscribe to get the best of Noema.
|
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|
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More From Noema Magazine
|
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|
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[65]
|
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[66] Essay [67]Digital Society
|
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[68] Reclaiming Europe’s Digital Sovereignty
|
||||
[69]Francesca Bria
|
||||
[70] Illustration by Noah Campeau for Noema Magazine.
|
||||
Audio Icon
|
||||
[71] Essay [72]Geopolitics & Globalization
|
||||
[73] Is European AI A Lost Cause? Not Necessarily.
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[74]Benjamin Bratton
|
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[75] Illustration by Christina S. Zhu for Noema Magazine.
|
||||
Audio Icon
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[76] Essay [77]Digital Society
|
||||
[78] A Diverse World Of Sovereign AI Zones
|
||||
[79]Nathan Gardels
|
||||
[80][noema-logo]
|
||||
|
||||
[81] Published
|
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by the
|
||||
Berggruen
|
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Institute
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[82]Terms of Service
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[83]Privacy Policy
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©2025 Noema Magazine
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Topics
|
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• [84]Technology & the Human
|
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• [85]Future of Capitalism
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• [86]Philosophy & Culture
|
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• [87]Climate Crisis
|
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• [88]Geopolitics & Deglobalization
|
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• [89]Future of Democracy
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• [90]Digital Society
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About
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• [91]About Us
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References:
|
||||
|
||||
[1] https://www.noemamag.com/the-last-days-of-social-media/#site-content
|
||||
[2] https://www.noemamag.com/
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[3] https://www.noemamag.com/subscribe
|
||||
[4] https://www.berggruen.org/
|
||||
[5] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/technology-and-the-human/
|
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[6] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/future-of-capitalism/
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[7] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/philosophy-culture/
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[8] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/climate-crisis/
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|
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|
||||
[23] https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/ai-spam-accounts-build-followers
|
||||
[24] https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-151
|
||||
[25] https://www.wired.com/story/gadget-lab-podcast-632/
|
||||
[26] https://www.theguardian.com/global/commentisfree/2025/jan/08/ai-generated-slop-slowly-killing-internet-nobody-trying-to-stop-it
|
||||
[27] https://www.niemanlab.org/2024/04/from-shrimp-jesus-to-fake-self-portraits-ai-generated-images-have-become-the-latest-form-of-social-media-spam/
|
||||
[28] https://www.reddit.com/user/spez/comments/1kfciml/reddits_next_chapter_smarter_easier_still_human/
|
||||
[29] https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/tiktok-content-farms-use-ai-voiceovers-to-mass-produce-political-misinformation/
|
||||
[30] https://restofworld.org/2023/ai-tiktok-creators-rewrite-history/
|
||||
[31] https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/02/06/the-vast-and-sophisticated-global-enterprise-that-is-scam-inc
|
||||
[32] https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.13047
|
||||
[33] https://scienceblog.com/social-media-bots-create-more-chatter-but-less-meaningful-conversation-research-shows/
|
||||
[34] https://www.supercreator.app/automation#:~:text=Supercreator%20%2D%20Engage%20Fans%20With%20OnlyFans,more%20proactive%20in%20your%20conversations.
|
||||
[35] https://variety.com/2024/digital/news/onlyfans-payments-2023-financials-revenue-creator-earnings-1236135425/
|
||||
[36] https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-promote-onlyfans-according-to-creators
|
||||
[37] https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.02627
|
||||
[38] https://aijourn.com/how-ai-is-revolutionizing-digital-content-creation-from-face-swaps-to-lip-syncing/
|
||||
[39] https://www.tiktok.com/@itstarachristina/video/7350403031969713441?lang=en
|
||||
[40] https://www.wired.com/story/onlyfans-models-are-using-ai-impersonators-to-keep-up-with-their-dms/
|
||||
[41] https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2401.02627
|
||||
[42] https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/social-media-and-news-fact-sheet/
|
||||
[43] https://www.theverge.com/24063290/fediverse-explained-activitypub-social-media-open-protocol
|
||||
[44] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/mar/26/twitter-usage-in-us-fallen-by-a-fifth-since-elon-musks-takeover
|
||||
[45] https://time.com/6305383/meta-threads-failing
|
||||
[46] https://www.tubefilter.com/2025/01/10/twitch-lowest-watch-time-streams-charts-top-streamers-december-2024/
|
||||
[47] https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-sub-section-state-of-social
|
||||
[48] https://jamescosullivan.substack.com/p/we-cant-get-enough-of-the-bullshit
|
||||
[49] https://www.psychiatry.org/news-room/news-releases/more-new-years-mental-health-resolutions
|
||||
[50] https://www.theguardian.com/media/2025/jul/05/cant-pause-internet-social-media-creators-burnout
|
||||
[51] https://www.apa.org/news/apa/2022/social-media-children-teens
|
||||
[52] https://search.worldcat.org/en/title/1359918931
|
||||
[53] https://shop.noemamag.com/?utm_source=MiddleCTA&utm_medium=website
|
||||
[54] https://dig.watch/updates/messaging-app-signal-sees-rising-popularity-in-us-and-europe
|
||||
[55] https://www.are.na/
|
||||
[56] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/utilities-for-democracy-why-and-how-the-algorithmic-infrastructure-of-facebook-and-google-must-be-regulated/
|
||||
[57] https://docs.bsky.app/docs/advanced-guides/atproto
|
||||
[58] https://lens.xyz/
|
||||
[59] https://docs.farcaster.xyz/
|
||||
[60] https://www.noemamag.com/we-need-to-rewild-the-internet/
|
||||
[61] https://www.noemamag.com/the-great-decentralization/
|
||||
[62] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/08/technology/misinformation-students-media-literacy.html
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
[65] https://www.noemamag.com/reclaiming-europes-digital-sovereignty
|
||||
[66] https://www.noemamag.com/article-type/essay/
|
||||
[67] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/digital-society/
|
||||
[68] https://www.noemamag.com/reclaiming-europes-digital-sovereignty
|
||||
[69] https://www.noemamag.com/author/francescabria/
|
||||
[70] https://www.noemamag.com/is-european-ai-a-lost-cause-not-necessarily
|
||||
[71] https://www.noemamag.com/article-type/essay/
|
||||
[72] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/geopolitics-globalization/
|
||||
[73] https://www.noemamag.com/is-european-ai-a-lost-cause-not-necessarily
|
||||
[74] https://www.noemamag.com/author/benjaminbratton/
|
||||
[75] https://www.noemamag.com/a-diverse-world-of-sovereign-ai-zones
|
||||
[76] https://www.noemamag.com/article-type/essay/
|
||||
[77] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/digital-society/
|
||||
[78] https://www.noemamag.com/a-diverse-world-of-sovereign-ai-zones
|
||||
[79] https://www.noemamag.com/author/nathan-gardels/
|
||||
[80] https://www.noemamag.com/
|
||||
[81] https://www.berggruen.org/
|
||||
[82] https://www.noemamag.com/terms-of-use/
|
||||
[83] https://www.noemamag.com/privacy-policy
|
||||
[84] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/technology-and-the-human/
|
||||
[85] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/future-of-capitalism/
|
||||
[86] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/philosophy-culture/
|
||||
[87] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/climate-crisis/
|
||||
[88] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/geopolitics-globalization/
|
||||
[89] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/future-of-democracy/
|
||||
[90] https://www.noemamag.com/article-topic/digital-society/
|
||||
[91] https://www.noemamag.com/about-noema/
|
||||
[92] https://www.noemamag.com/masthead/
|
||||
[93] https://www.noemamag.com/masthead/#staff-editorial-board-anchor-link
|
||||
[94] https://shop.noemamag.com/
|
||||
[95] https://www.noemamag.com/careers/
|
||||
[96] https://www.noemamag.com/contact/
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[97] https://www.noemamag.com/newsletter/
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[98] https://www.facebook.com/NoemaMag
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[99] https://www.instagram.com/noemamag/
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[100] https://twitter.com/NoemaMag
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[101] https://www.linkedin.com/company/noemamag
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||||
[102] https://www.youtube.com/c/noemamagazine
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[103] https://www.tiktok.com/@noemamag
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[104] https://bsky.app/profile/noemamag.com
|
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[105] https://www.noemamag.com/terms-of-use/
|
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[106] https://www.noemamag.com/privacy-policy
|
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