419 lines
23 KiB
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419 lines
23 KiB
Plaintext
[1]wreckage/salvage
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Bad shape
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21 days ago by [7]Erin Kissane — 11 min read
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Bad shape
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The idea I keep coming back to is that the big platforms, like Dickens' Marley,
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were dead to begin with, and are now something particularly bad, which is dead
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on their feet.
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In the game of Go, bad shape is the term for configurations of stones on the
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game board that are inefficient in achieving their offensive goal (territory
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capture) and unlikely to achieve their defensive goal (the state of "[8]life").
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You can extend a bad shape in a fruitless attempt to make it better, but you'll
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generally be wasting your time.
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The idea I keep coming back to is that the big platforms, [9]like Marley, were
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dead to begin with, and are now something particularly bad, which is dead on
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their feet. Not because they’re been abandoned by users (yet) but because
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they’re structurally incapable of governing the systems they made, and most of
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the things they try to do about it introduce more and weirder problems.
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While they were still gobbling hundreds of millions of new users each year—and
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while the old political machines were still catching up—platforms could outrun
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the problem. Now, though, the number of remaining uncaptured humans dwindles,
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the politicians and propagandists have adapted to exploit the mass-scale
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machinery the platforms provide, and the positions platform companies have
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contorted themselves into trying to shoehorn governance into ungovernable
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structures are increasingly hard to maintain.
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Facebook especially is likely to zombie-shamble along for some time, held
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upright by its deep weave into the coordination of offline life and by [10]the
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communities for whom it serves as a sole accessible connection to the internet,
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but the whole apparatus looks increasingly precarious.
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(These are very simple points, but it remains a wince-inducing faux pas to say
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them in a lot of tech-thinking spaces, so I will keep pushing on the obvious.)
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The evidence of the past decade and a half argues strongly that platform
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corporations are structurally incapable of good governance, primarily because
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most of their central aims (continuous growth, market dominance, profit via
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extraction) conflict with many basic human and societal needs.
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As entities, large social platforms continuously undergo rapid mutations in
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service of their need to maximize profit and expansion while minimizing the
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kinds of societal and individual harm that can plausibly cause them regulatory
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trouble or user disengagement. (The set of things that can cause trouble is
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also always shifting, as political and cultural spheres influence and are
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influenced by the platforms.) But platform mutations emerge only within a
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narrow range of possibilities delineated by the set of decisions considered
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valid in, roughly speaking, [11]Milton Friedman's model of corporate purpose.
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Within this circumscribed mutation zone, certain goals are able to be named and
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earnestly pursued ("stop spam" or "eliminate the distribution of CSAM"), even
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if they're never achieved. Other goals (anything to do with hate speech,
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incitement to violence, or misinformation, for example) can be named and
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pursued, but only in ways that don't hinder the workings of the
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profit-extraction machinery—which mostly means that they come in on the margins
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and after the fact, as in "[12]after the fact of a genocide that Facebook had
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years of explicit advance warnings about." Working on the margins and after the
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fact still matters—less damage is better than more damage—but it means "trust
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and safety" is kept well clear of the core.
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Again, this is all simple and obvious. A tractor structurally can't spare a
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thought for the lives of the fieldmice; shouting at the tractor when it
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destroys their nests is a category error. Business does business. The
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production line doesn't stop just because a few people lose fingers or lives.
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And what is a modern corporation but a legal spell for turning reasoning beings
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into temporarily vacant machines? We know this, which is why we have OSHA and
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the FAA and the FTC, for now.
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It's no surprise that when prodded by entities with cultural or regulatory
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power, platforms build more semi-effective AI classifiers, hire more underpaid
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contract moderators, and temporarily stiffen their unevenly enforced community
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rules, but then immediately slump back toward their natural form, which appears
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to be a cartoonishly overgrown early-2000s web forum crammed with soft targets
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and overrun by trolling, spam, and worse.
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It’s possible to make the argument that sufficiently strong leadership could
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make even a tech corporation appear to be capable of holding an ethical line,
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and maybe even capable of accepting slightly smaller profits in service of
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socially beneficial goals—and that, conversely, the awful people in charge are
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the main source of the problems. It’s not a very good argument, though, even
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when I make it myself.
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Yes, X is currently controlled by a bizarrely gibbering billionaire with
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obvious symptoms of late-stage Mad King disease. Yes, Facebook and
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Instagram—which control vastly more territory than X—are controlled by a
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feckless, Tulip-craze-mainlining billionaire with a long history of grudgingly
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up-regulating governance efforts when under public or governmental pressure and
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then immediately axeing them when the spotlight moves on. But would these
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platforms inflict less damage if they were led by people who valued the well
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being of others? Probably yes, to a degree. Twitter/X has offered a lurid
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natural experiment, and the changes in X after it moved from Jack Dorsey’s
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spacey techno-libertarian leadership to Elon Musk’s desperately needy
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quasi-fascist circus act have been obviously bad. A version of Meta founded and
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led by someone with a reasonably sharp ethical grounding clearly wouldn’t look
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much like the real Meta at all.
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On the other hand, TikTok’s social function is reasonably close to Meta and
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X’s, and the fact that [13]its CEO, Shou Zi Chew, seems like a relatively
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normal person, doesn’t seem to have correlated with dramatically better
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performance in eliminating [14]Nazi organizing, [15]genocidal and
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violence-inciting content, [16]CSAM distribution ([17]archive link), or the
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kind of [18]semi-pro disinformation that makes it harder for people
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experiencing natural disasters to understand what’s happening.
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Crucially, more reasonable CEO behavior doesn’t seem to prevent the lower-level
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and potentially even more destructive social effects of platforms that [19]
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Henry Farrell persuasively explains from a social theory perspective, or that
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Renée DiResta memorably calls a “Cambrian explosion of subjective, bespoke
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realities” in [20]Invisible Rulers.* (I'll do a separate post collecting
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thoughts on this angle, because it's too important to breeze by.)
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The realities of our moment also work against arguments for the potential of
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heroic leadership: even apparently level-headed tech executives now appear to
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understand that the next Trump Administration intends to rule unreasonably and
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vengefully, and that failure to [21]perform obeisance and [22]make tribute may
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result in federal interference that could plausibly unmake their companies.
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Those are not risks any global corporation can take, but our oddball lineup of
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big platform companies is in a special bind. No matter how desperately they
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want to be seen as neutral utilities, they have functioned, for good and ill,
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like social and political wrecking balls—and real or feigned misapprehensions
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about algorithms and censorship notwithstanding, real-world governments
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understand this. The second coming of Trump makes the situation especially
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stark, but the underlying dynamics are neither new nor temporary.
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Given that every large platform posing as a public square has put itself into
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the genuinely untenable situation of acting as a global corporate arbiter of
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politically hot speech, they will all always be in the gunsights of the world’s
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least reasonable governments. This was bad enough for the platforms when the
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least reasonable governments were Putin’s or Erdoğan’s or Modi’s—a truly
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unreasonable government in control of their home jurisdiction is an existential
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threat.
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And again, in reality, the corporations are configured to try to address the
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least political kinds of abuse—CSAM, spam, scams, and a few other forms of
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inauthentic behavior—and very little else. As a result, they can’t govern more
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subtle or politicized speech for much longer than I can roll a quarter down a
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piece of string.
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So what would it take for a corporation to become capable of good governance of
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things like political speech, incitement to violence and genocide, hate speech,
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most forms of inauthentic behavior, and platform manipulation? Two things, at
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least:
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• The ability and willingness to take and hold ethical stances that will be
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sharply unpopular with large swathes of the people mostly likely to
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effectively target them with legislation and abuses of power, and
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• the ability and willingness to devote something approaching the majority of
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their company’s time, money, and attention to building and running [23]
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devolved or [24]federated systems for doing high-performance high-context
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local governance according to those unpopular ethical stances.
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Can you bring yourself to imagine—concretely and in detail—these conditions
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occurring in the leadership of a global corporation?
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And again, achieving a mode of governance that can appropriately handle those
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most obvious elements—the hate speech, the network abuse, the inauthentic
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behavior, all of it—is necessary but not sufficient for reaching something like
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a healthy equilibrium. The elements of big social platforms that make them
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attractive and fun and profitable are the same elements that, as currently
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implemented, turn low-level human behavior patterns around status, belief,
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conformity, and predation into a high-speed mass-scale mess of fractured
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publics and realities.
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Two points of clarification: First, I’m not saying “Can’t fix people problems
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with technology,” which is exactly as true and useful as “Guns don’t kill
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people, people kill people.” (I used the former in what I thought was a very
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obviously sarcastic way, but apparently the intent was insufficiently clear.)
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If a technological system makes human problems worse, you have to fix the
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system or break it and build a better one.
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Second, none of what I’m trying to get at here is about the intent of people
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who work on big platforms. Corporate platform trust and safety staff routinely
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work themselves to the brink of individual illness or collapse to handle what
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they’re permitted and resourced to handle—which is itself a tiny fraction of
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what would be necessary to handle to make platforms good. Corporate platform
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governance by technology companies whose success requires growth and
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attention-extraction, though, is a bankrupt idea.
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If we briefly isolate the reality of our technological present, it’s hard to
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find it anything but absurd to expect a corporation to govern global or even
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local speech for any humanist value of “well.” And no one chose it, exactly, it
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just happened when the fantasies of the internet as an Apollonian zone of
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libertarian splendor met the reality of globally connected primate brains under
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late capitalism. I explicitly blame the connected-computer dream of
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technologically mediated liberation as cartoonishly exemplified in [25]JP
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Barlow’s Declaration, which centered on keeping the bad old world of human
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governance, which it equated with censorship, out of the internet:
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You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this
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claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don't
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exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will
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identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social
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Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our
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world, not yours. Our world is different.
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The governance arose, all right, once the money got real.
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The computer dream’s rapidly evaporating and over-salinated shallows are still
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keeping the tech industry’s dumbest boats afloat, but the platforms have been
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scraping bottom for years while their owners slap on layers and layers of
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patches and bilge-pumps and bucket brigades manned by people from former
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colonies. The problem isn't (just) turning fact-checking on or off or
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deactivating a swarm of halfassed AI classifers or ceasing to pretend to act on
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most reports of misconduct, it's bad shape.
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All of which is to say that yes, Zuckerberg is a terrible chump and Musk is a
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grotesque quasi-Rasputin, and that does matter, but the boards they stand on
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have been rotten the whole time. Centralized corporate governance of global
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mega-platforms was always a goofy idea, and we should have given up on it years
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ago.
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This is where I get into awkward situations with lovely people, including
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several I count as friends, because they’re determined "not to let platforms
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off the hook.” I feel this, deeply, along with things like send the Sacklers to
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the guillotine. But keeping the fucked-up mutant fish on the hook will not
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magically transform it into an entity capable of governing.
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—
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Earlier this week at Platformer, [26]Casey Newton reported some insider views
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on what Meta’s most recent roll-back of content moderation and fact-checking
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means. The post is worth reading, and after the Myanmar research I did in 2023,
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and for what it’s worth, I don’t think Casey’s sources overstate the dangers
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inherent in what Meta’s doing: more real human beings are going to suffer and
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lose children and be killed because of this. But I want to look at something in
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the cursory background section of the newsletter, about the work that Meta put
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in after 2016, when Facebook got criticized for hosting election-interference
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ops in the US:
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Chastened by the criticism, Meta set out to shore up its defenses. It hired
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40,000 content moderators around the world, invested heavily in building
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new technology to analyze content for potential harms and flag it for
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review, and became the world’s leading funder of third-party fact-checking
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organizations. It spent $280 million to create an independent Oversight
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Board to adjudicate the most difficult questions about online speech. It
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disrupted dozens of networks of state-sponsored trolls who sought to use
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Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp to spread propaganda and attack
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dissenters.
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[27]According to Financial Times reporting ([28]archive link), Meta currently
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employs or has contracted with about 40,000 people to work on “safety and
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security,” of which just 15,000 are content moderators, for a user base of
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roughly four billion users, which works out to more than a quarter of a million
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users per moderator. This chimes with [29]New York Times reporting ([30]archive
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link) suggesting that in 2021, Accenture was billing Facebook for about 5,800
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full-time contract moderators. (For what it’s worth, in 2017, Meta promised to
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add all of [31]3,000 trust and safety staff.) Nor are Meta’s moderation
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resources allocated evenly: About 90% of Facebook users are outside the US and
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Canada; that overwhelming majority gets [32]approximately 13% of the company’s
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moderation time ([33]archive link).
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And while we’re here, in 2020—the year Oversight Board started hiring—Meta
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cleared about $91 billion in profit. The Oversight Board trust got $280 million
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from Meta, or just over 0.3% of the company’s annual profits. The Oversight
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Board itself, though inclined to deliver thoughtful if glacially slow
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recommendations, appears to have accomplished [34]remarkably little.
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Again: The work tens of thousands of people around the world put in to try to
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make platforms less terrible is real and essential work, and it’s often done at
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a terrible cost. It’s also the barest gesture at serious governance, and much
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of it is pure Potemkin Village.
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That’s only a couple of things pulled from one paragraph that happened to hit
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my inbox while I was drafting this post, but I did [35]a whole lot of that kind
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of close reading in 2023, and came out believing that platform intensifications
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of governance in response to periodic governmental pressure are best understood
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as a little bit of real (though deeply inadequate) change and a whole lot of
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[36]flopping. Then, when the pressure comes off, the platforms re-orient like
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compass needles tossed into in an MRI machine.
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—
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[37]Barlow’s Declaration—which is excruciating and which I’ve been making
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myself reread annually for years as penance for participating in tech
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culture—ends like this:
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We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more
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humane and fair than the world your governments have made before.
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What we got instead was a handful of global-scale company towns that continue
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to prove their comprehensive unfitness to govern and their absolute
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vulnerability to the offline governments the free internet was meant to work
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around.
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So sure: [38]Protocols over platforms. Then we have to actually do the
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inelegant, un-heroic, expensive work of rebuilding the essential structures of
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human civilization on top of the protocols, because it turns out we just have
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the one world, online or off, no way out.
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Thank you
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This post, like the others on this site, exists [39]because people have signed
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on to support the work. If you find it useful, and your situation allows for it
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with ease, please consider signing up! Enormous thanks to those of you who
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have. And a note to members: I've wrestled down the Ghost commenting problem
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and the first real discussion post for project members goes up tomorrow, so if
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you've signed up for a paid membership, look for that in your inbox soon.
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Notes
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* Renée’s book is very good and I recommend it for its lucid explanations and
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commitment to drawing on previous eras of mass communication without doing too
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deeply into either theoretical or historical rabbitholes (which I love, but
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which don’t make for popular reading). I don’t 100% agree with her conclusions,
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but they’re clearly stated and cleanly argued, which allows for productive
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disagreement—and I value that more than full alignment.
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A common response to the things I've been posting is "Okay, but what will work,
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then?" I think there are hints at answers in the very chunky [40]fediverse
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governance research I worked on last year, in online and offline cooperatives,
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in [41]Rudy Fraser's Blacksky, and in the kinds of projects Nathan Schneider
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assesses in [42]Governable Spaces. I'll continue to explore what I think might
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be good shapes for governance here in ways that—I hope—will be more pragmatic
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than quixotic.
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The featured diagram for this post is International Marine Engineering's 1912
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depiction of the profile and deck of the Titanic ([43]v. 17, p. 199).
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[44] [45] [46] The link has been copied!
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[47][https://www.wrecka.g]
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[48] How we'll do discussions here
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Newer post
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[49]How we'll do discussions here
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Older post
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[50]What people in the global majority need from networks
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[51] What people in the global majority need from networks
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Subscribe to new posts.
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[52][ ] Subscribe
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choose your type:
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• [54]( ) fancy (default)
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• [55]( ) simpler
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[56]wreckage/salvage
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Making and mending networks for humans.
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wreckage/salvage © Erin Kissane 2025
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References:
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[1] https://www.wrecka.ge/
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[3] https://www.wrecka.ge/about/
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[4] https://www.wrecka.ge/tag/posts/
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[5] https://www.wrecka.ge/#/portal
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[6] https://www.wrecka.ge/signin/
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[7] https://www.wrecka.ge/author/erin/
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[8] https://senseis.xmp.net/?LifeAndDeath
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[9] https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46/46-h/46-h.htm
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[10] https://www.theengineroom.org/library/new-report-exploring-a-transition-to-alternative-social-media-platforms-for-social-justice-organizations-in-the-majority-world/
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[11] https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html
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[12] https://erinkissane.com/meta-in-myanmar-part-i-the-setup
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[13] https://www.wired.com/story/shou-zi-chew-tik-tok-big-interview/
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[14] https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/naztok-an-organized-neo-nazi-tiktok-network-is-getting-millions-of-views/
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[15] https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/HateScape_v5.pdf
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[16] https://www.ft.com/content/d5549d48-8f02-464c-9c7d-17404a5b6d02
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[17] https://archive.ph/tvn8K
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[18] https://newrepublic.com/article/186928/misinformation-new-normal-disaster-response
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[19] https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/were-getting-the-social-media-crisis
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[20] https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/renee-diresta/invisible-rulers/9781541703377/
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[21] https://www.newsweek.com/tech-ceos-donations-donald-trump-joe-biden-inaugurations-compared-2010457
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[22] https://qz.com/google-youtube-trump-inauguration-meta-amazon-apple-1851736124
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[23] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devolution
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[24] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalism
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[25] https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
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[26] https://www.platformer.news/meta-fact-checking-free-speech-surrender/?ref=platformer-newsletter
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[27] https://www.ft.com/content/afeb56f2-9ba5-4103-890d-91291aea4caa
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[28] https://archive.ph/UxgFy
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[29] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/technology/facebook-accenture-content-moderation.html
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[30] https://archive.ph/SEZpr
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[31] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/technology/facebook-moderators-q1-earnings.html
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[32] https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-drug-cartels-human-traffickers-response-is-weak-documents-11631812953
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[33] https://archive.ph/https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-drug-cartels-human-traffickers-response-is-weak-documents-11631812953
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[34] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/meta-s-oversight-board-and-the-need-for-a-new-theory-of-online-speech
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[35] https://erinkissane.com/meta-in-myanmar-part-iii-the-inside-view
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[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml8kf3UIpN0
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[37] https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
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[38] https://knightcolumbia.org/content/protocols-not-platforms-a-technological-approach-to-free-speech
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[39] https://www.wrecka.ge/#/portal
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[40] https://fediverse-governance.github.io/
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||
[41] https://www.wired.com/story/blacksky-is-nothing-like-black-twitter/
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[42] https://www.ucpress.edu/books/governable-spaces/epub-pdf
|
||
[43] https://archive.org/details/internationalma171912newy/page/198/mode/2up
|
||
[44] https://tootpick.org/#text=%22Bad%20shape%22%20https://www.wrecka.ge/bad-shape/
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||
[45] https://bsky.app/intent/compose?text=%22Bad%20shape%22+https://www.wrecka.ge/bad-shape/
|
||
[46] javascript:
|
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[48] https://www.wrecka.ge/how-we-do-it-here/
|
||
[49] https://www.wrecka.ge/how-we-do-it-here/
|
||
[50] https://www.wrecka.ge/what-people-in-the-global-majority-need-from-networks/
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||
[51] https://www.wrecka.ge/what-people-in-the-global-majority-need-from-networks/
|
||
[56] https://www.wrecka.ge/
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